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Abolishing privately created 
money would increase GDP. 
 
 
Abstract. 
In an economy where privately created money is banned, 
i.e. where the only form of money is state issued money, 
there is no obvious reason why interest rates would not 
settle down to some sort of genuine free market level. On 
the assumption normally made in economics, namely that 
GDP is maximised where market forces prevail unless 
market failure can be demonstrated, and given that there 
is no obvious reason to suspect market failure under the 
latter ban, that means that GDP is maximised where 
privately issued money is banned. 
One reason for thinking a state money only system (SMO) 
is more of a genuine free market than the existing system 
is that in free markets, producers normally bear the full 
costs of production and pass those costs on to customers. 
However, under the existing bank system, private banks 
can obtain money for free (administration costs apart) 
because those banks can effectively print money. Other 
corporations do not have that privilege. I.e. under SMO, 
banks and non-bank corporations are on an equal footing.  
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It might seem odd to claim that SMO is closer to a free 
market than the alternatives, given that free markets are 
normally associated with scenarios where the private 
sector dominates, or (same thing), associated with the 
state playing little or no role. However the latter 
generalisation does not apply to money. A hint as to why 
is contained in the well-known phrase “money is a 
creature of the state”. That is, governments inevitably play 
an important role when it comes to a country’s currency, 
thus the only question is: what should that role be? 
While interest rates are higher and debts are lower under 
SMO, any deflationary effect of those higher rates is easily 
countered by creating and spending more base money 
and/or cutting taxes. 
If SMO in fact maximises GDP, and that system is 
implemented, states (or more specifically central banks’) 
ability to adjust interest rates is curtailed. Given that it is 
widely accepted that interest rate adjustments are a good 
way of adjusting demand, that might appear to be a 
weakness in the argument here. In fact there are glaring 
flaws in artificial interest rate adjustments. Thus the latter 
apparent weakness is not a weakness at all. 
 
________________________ 
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A good way of solving a problem is to take the simplest 
possible case of the problem, solve that, and then add the 
complexities of the real world. That ploy will be adopted 
here in that different possible monetary systems will be 
illustrated by considering a hypothetical barter economy 
that decides to adopt money. (Readers who want to claim 
that ploy is invalid because barter economies never 
existed, please see endnote 1). 
In barter economies, people lend goods to each other, 
and in effect charge interest sometimes. For example in a 
desert island barter economy, one person lending a 
fishing rod to another person might want a few fish as a 
reward for the loan. At the same time, no doubt loans in 
barter economies are sometimes granted for altruistic 
reasons, just as they are for example between family 
members in money based economies sometimes.  No 
doubt interest in barter economies is not calculated with 
the same accuracy as in money based economies, but 
interest is still sometimes charged. 
 
Should creditors lose access to what they lend? 
Note that when one person lends goods to another in a 
barter economy, the lender loses access to the goods as 
long as the borrower has possession of them.  
That is in contrast to the real world bank system where 
money deposited at a bank can be loaned on by the bank 
while the depositor still has access to the money, a piece 
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of trickery which many regard as fraud. Indeed the basic 
argument here is that that “trickery” results in an artificially 
low rate of interest plus excessive debts, and thus does 
not maximise GDP. (Incidentally, for readers who object to 
the latter “lend on” idea on the grounds that banks 
allegedly create money rather than intermediate between 
borrowers and lenders, see endnote 2.) 
Indeed former governor of the Bank of England, Mervyn 
King (2016) referred to the above possibly fraudulent 
nature of the existing bank system. As he put it “This is a 
confidence trick in two senses: it works if, and only if, 
confidence is strong; and it is fraudulent. Financial 
institutions make promises that, in likely states of the 
world, they cannot keep.” 
Levitin (2015) in the opening sentences of his abstract 
refers to the above accepting and lending on of deposits 
as “irreconcilable”. Around two hundred and fifty years 
ago David Hume referred to the latter activity of private 
banks as “counterfeiting”, as did the economics Nobel 
laureate, Maurice Allais (See the opening sentences of 
Philips (1992)). 
While interest rates are no doubt calculated in barter 
economies in a far more haphazard way than in money 
based economies, there is no obvious reason why, at 
least in principle, interest rates would not settle down to 
some sort of genuine free market rate in barter 
economies. Put another way, there is no obvious reason 
why interest rates would be artificially high or low. 
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 A barter economy adopts money. 
Where a barter economy decides to adopt money, it has 
various options as follows. 
1. “State issued fiat money only” (SMO). 
2. “Privately issued fiat money only”.  
3. “Gold standard private money only”.  
4. “State and private fiat money”: the system that exists in 
the real world at the time of writing.  
Those four will now be considered in turn. The first option 
occupies most of the rest of this paper, i.e. options two, 
three and four are disposed of fairly quickly towards the 
end of this paper. 
Re the first option, SMO, that comes to the same thing as 
full reserve banking as advocated for example by 
Lawrence Kotlikoff (2012), Milton Friedman ((1960) 2
nd
 
half of Ch3) and Werner (2010).  (For readers not sure 
what full reserve banking is, see endnote 3).  
Under that system there is no obvious reason why interest 
rates would not settle down to some sort of genuine free 
market rate. (The obvious possible criticism of that point, 
namely that anything organised by the state is the very 
antithesis of a free market is dealt with below.) 
Moreover, it is widely accepted in economics that GDP is 
maximised where goods and services change hands at 
free market prices, unless market failure can be 
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demonstrated. E.g. unless there are obvious social costs 
involved in producing widgets, the normal assumption in 
economics is that GDP will be maximised where widgets 
are traded at their free market price. Same goes for the 
price of borrowed money (i.e. interest rates). 
 
Costs of production. 
One reason why something like a genuine free market 
rate of interest prevails under SMO is thus. In a free 
market, producers of any commodity bear the full cost of 
production, and pass those costs on to customers. And in 
the case of money, most firms and households have only 
two main ways of obtaining money: borrow it and earn it.  
However, commercial banks (henceforth just “banks”) 
have a third way, namely simply creating money out of 
thin air, and that costs them nothing. As Huber (2000) put 
it, “Allowing banks to create new money out of nothing 
enables them to cream off a special profit. They lend the 
money to their customers at the full rate of interest, 
without having to pay any interest on it themselves. So 
their profit on this part of their business is not, say, 9% 
credit-interest less 4% debit-interest = 5% normal profit; it 
is 9% credit-interest less 0% debit-interest = 9% profit = 
5% normal profit plus 4% additional special profit.”  
Incidentally, the legal underpinning for that artificial 
privilege for banks is explained by Werner (2014). Also, 
there is a brief explanation as to how private banks create 
money in a Bank of England article (McLeay (2014)). 
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So under SMO, there is a level playing field as between 
banks and non-bank corporations. I.e. there is no artificial 
preference for banks, and a system where there is no 
artificial preference for any particular type of corporation is 
closer to a free market, all else equal, than where the field 
is not level. 
The provisional conclusion is that it is beginning to look 
like under SMO there is a genuine free market rate of 
interest. 
 
Maturity transformation. 
One characteristic of SMO is that if a bank wants to lend 
$X it has to find someone willing to tie up $X for a 
significant period, which mirrors what happens where one 
person lends goods to another in a barter economy. Thus 
that arrangement is perfectly natural. 
Having suggested there are merits in a system where 
there is no maturity transformation (MT), it might seem 
that in the case of long term loans like mortgages, lenders 
would be condemned to parting with their money for years 
or even decades. However, that is not actually the case 
because for every term account depositor wanting quicker 
than expected access to their money, chances are there’d 
be another wanting to TIE UP their money for a few 
months. I.e. the latter could just take over the account 
held by the former. Or if someone wanted very quick 
access to money they’d loaned out, and no one wanted to 
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buy the account at face value, there’d be nothing to stop 
them selling the loan at a discount to its face value. Plus it 
would be perfect possible under such a system to have a 
law preventing banks from making new loans till they had 
repaid money to all customers who had put their money in 
term accounts but who changed their mind and wanted 
quick access to their money. 
 
Maturity transformation achieves nothing. 
As pointed out just above, under SMO, there is no MT. 
But the conventional wisdom (spelled out in a hundred 
economcis text books) is that MT is beneficial. That might 
seem to be a weakness in the arguments here, but in fact 
it is not, because MT is a farce, and for the following 
reasons. 
Non-bank entities (households, non-bank firms, etc) aim 
for a stock of money that suits them. As explained in the 
text books that stock is normally something like “enough 
to enable day to day transactions for the next month or 
two, plus something to cater for the unexpected”. And 
money is a bank liability which is easily and quickly 
transferred to some other entity. The latter “transfer” takes 
place when someone writes a cheque or does a debit card 
transaction for example. 
Now if we start with a hypothetical economy where MT is 
banned and then assume that it is allowed, a proportion of 
the money that bank customers have in term accounts 
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becomes instantly available. And according to the 
economics text books that is beneficial because it enables 
bank customers to earn some of the generous rates of 
interest that come with term accounts, while at the same 
time having instant access to their money. 
There is however a snag. As just explained, the result of 
introducing MT is that everyone’s stock of instantly 
available money rises. The result is that bank customers 
will try to spend away some of that excess stock, which 
will be inflationary assuming the economy is already at 
capacity. As a result, government will have to impose 
deflationary measures of some sort, like raising taxes and 
confiscating a proportion of everyone’s stock of money!  
Also, bank customers when a proportion of the money in 
their term accounts becomes instantly available, will deal 
with the excess amount of instant access money they then 
have by placing it in term accounts or “very long term term 
accounts”, thus nullifying the basic objective of MT. 
In short, the alleged benefits of MT are pretty much of a 
mirage, if not a comlete mirage. 
 
Private money creation involves an externality. 
A second reason for thinking SMO is nearer to a free 
market than the alternatives has to do with externalities. 
Advocates of free markets and economists generally do 
not actually advocate a totally free “no holds barred” free 
10 
 
 
market in that it is widely accepted that externalities 
should not be allowed. And private money creation 
involves a very obvious externality as follows. 
Assuming SMO is in place and private money creation is 
then allowed, banks will then create and lend out money 
at below the going rate of interest. But the extra spending 
that stems from those loans will be inflationary, which in 
turn means government will have to impose some sort of 
deflationary measure like raising taxes: i.e. confiscate 
money from the non-bank private sector. And confiscation 
is a blatant form of externality.  
 
Justifiable stimulus. 
As distinct from the latter scenario where extra demand 
stemming from private money creation is not needed, an 
alternative scenario (one that often occurs in the real 
world) is that that extra demand is in fact needed. This 
alternative scenario is simply the situation where the 
economy is seen as not being at capacity, and the central 
bank cuts interest rates so as to boost demand. And the 
conventional wisdom is that such interest rate cuts are 
beneficial, which in turn would seem to suggest that letting 
private banks create money is equally beneficial. 
However the flaw in that argument is that interest rate 
adjustments are a farce, and for the following reasons.  
First, given a recession, there is no good reason to 
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assume the cause is a lack of borrowing, lending and 
investment rather than a deficiency in some other element 
of aggregate demand, like consumer confidence or 
exports. 
Second, even if borrowing, lending and investment HAVE 
FALLEN just prior to a recession, they may have fallen for 
perfectly good reasons, e.g. a fall in demand for 
investment goods. 
Indeed, the absurdity of cutting interest rates so as to deal 
with a recession without looking very carefully at the 
cause of the recession was nicely illustrated in the recent 
recession. That is, the recession was sparked off by 
excessive and irresponsible lending by banks. And the 
reaction of the authorities? They cut interest rates so as to 
encourage more borrowing! That makes as much sense 
as trying to cure alcoholics by giving them crates of 
whiskey. 
Third, there is no obvious reason why, given a recession, 
interest rates do not fall of their own accord, as mentioned 
above. Certainly interest rates have fallen dramatically 
and of their own accord over the last twenty years. To the 
extent that that is true, there is no argument for additional 
and artificial interest rate cuts in a recession. 
Forth, the basic purpose of the economy is to produce 
what people want, both in the form of what they purchase 
out of disposable income and what they want in the form 
of state provided services. Ergo, if the economy is not at 
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capacity, the logical remedy is to cut taxes and raise 
public spending, rather than cut interest rates. 
Fifth, several other arguments against interest rate 
adjustments are set out by Werner (2010). 
 
The zero bound. 
The latter argument of course assumes there is scope to 
cut interest rates, which is the situation that prevailed in 
the West between WWII and around 2010. Since around 
2010, interest rates have been at or near zero, which 
means a slightly different ball game to where interest rates 
are well above zero. However, for the sake of simplicity, 
this paper will stick with the assumption that interest rates 
are well above zero. 
 
Interest rate adjustments in an emergency could be 
desirable. 
Having argued that interest rate adjustments are not a 
good way adjusting aggregate demand, that is not to say 
they should NEVER be used. One reason is that where a 
dose of deflation is needed, there can be limits, for 
example, to how far taxes can be raised because of the 
possible popular revolts or riots. 
Thus for political rather than economic reasons, temporary 
interest rate hikes might be desirable.  
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As to exactly how central banks would adjust interest 
rates under SMO given that the normal method of 
adjusting rates is thwarted there is no problem in 
RAISING rates. Central banks just need to wade into the 
market and offer to borrow money at above the going rate 
of interest. And while some central banks may be barred 
from doing that under existing legislation, there is no 
reason that legislation cannot be altered. 
As for CUTTING interest rates, they could do that by 
printing money and buying up government debt and/or 
blue chip corporate bonds: in other words quantitative 
easing. 
 
Don’t banks pay for money once it is deposited? 
The initial creation of money costs banks nothing if the 
cost of checking up on customers’ credit-worthiness is 
ignored (costs which are considered below). It could 
however be argued that that non-existent cost is only 
temporary in the sense that those banks have to pay 
interest to those who after receiving that money, deposit it 
at banks. (That is, people who borrow from banks spend 
the relevant money, thus that money ends up in the hands 
of others, who deposit it at their bank/s.) 
The answer to that is that banks have no need or motive 
to pay those depositors the full rate of interest – i.e. the 
above mentioned free market rate.  
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To illustrate, assume an economy is at capacity. Also 
assume banks spot lending opportunities which are not 
viable at the existing or free market rate of interest, but 
which ARE VIABLE at a lower rate. The obvious strategy 
for banks is to print money and lend it out at below the 
free market rate.  
As for the fact that banks then need to pay interest to 
depositors, banks can simply refuse to pay as much as 
they used to and there’s not much depositors can do 
about it. Most depositors have nowhere else to go. 
Indeed, interest rates have fallen significantly over the last 
twenty years and the interest on typical UK high street 
bank current accounts (“checking acconts” in the US) is 
now as good as zero, but there is not much the average 
depositor can do about that. 
Also, under the existing real world system, while the main 
objective is to cut rates for borrowers when central banks 
cut interest rates, interest paid to depositors inevitably 
falls at the same time. 
 
It costs central banks nothing to create money. 
Having argued against banks’ freedom to create money at 
no cost to themselves, it could be argued that under SMO, 
money is also produced at no cost (by the state) thus 
SMO is no better in that regard. Indeed, Milton Friedman 
made the point that creating and supplying the private 
sector with base money costs nothing in real terms. As he 
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put it it (using unnecessarily convoluted language): "It 
need cost society essentially nothing in real resources to 
provide the individual with the current services of an 
additional dollar in cash balances." 
However the flaw in that argument is that while it costs the 
state nothing to create money, it does normally cost 
private sector corporations and households something to 
obtain that money. That is, if a state decides to feed more 
state issued money into the private sector, private sector 
entities (corporations and households) normally obtain 
that money by working for the state (e.g. working for state 
sector instutions like the armed services or creating 
infrastructure for the state). 
Of course the state can choose to supply freshly created 
money to selected individuals FOR FREE (e.g. those on 
social security). Or it can do a helicopter drop. But the 
important point is that the fact that it costs the state 
nothing to create money does not mean households or 
corporations necessarily get that money for free. 
 
The Pigou effect. 
A third reason for thinking SMO results in a genuine free 
market rate of interest, or at least something close to that 
rate, has to do with the Pigou effect. 
The Pigou effect is the fact that in a perfectly free market 
and given a recession, wages and prices would fall, which 
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in turn would raise the real value of base money (and the 
national debt), which in turn raises the value of the private 
sector’s paper assets (base money plus national debt). 
That in turn would encourage spending which brings an 
end to the recession. However in the real world, the Pigou 
effect is thwarted by Keynes’s “sticky downwards” point: 
the fact that it is just not possible to cut wages in nominal 
terms, particularly in heavily unionised sectors of the 
economy, else one gets strikes, riots and so on. 
In contrast to the Pigou cure for recessions, there is no 
obvious obstruction to interest rates falling of their own 
accord in a recession. On that basis it would seem that if 
the real world economy is going to more closely resemble 
a free market, what is needed in a recession is to boost 
the real value of the above paper assets, and that can be 
done simply by having government run a deficit funded by 
new base money, a strategy that Keynes actually 
advocated in the early 1930s (Keynes (1933, 5
th
 
paragraph). 
There are of course two quite different stimulatory 
elements in the latter “deficit funded by new base money”: 
first there is what might be called the “fiscal element”, i.e. 
the mere fact of more state spending or tax cuts, and 
second there is the effect of increasing the private sector’s 
stock of money.  
The latter policy (i.e. using deficits to deal with recessions 
and leaving interest rates to find their own level) meshes 
very nicely with SMO. In particular, there is no need for 
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“money creating private banks” in this connection, since it 
is the latter which under existing policies play a central 
role in interest rate manipulation. 
 
State money only is antithesis of free market?  
It might seem there is a flaw in the above argument as 
follows. The conventional wisdom is that anything 
organised by the state is the very antithesis of a free 
market. The quick answer to that is that money is not 
really a free market phenomenon: certainly the historical 
evidence is that where money has arisen in various 
civilisations throughout history, it has not arisen (as is 
often claimed in the text books) because of the desire by 
the population to dispense with the inefficiencies of barter 
(although money clearly does dispense with those 
inefficiencies). Rather, the historical evidence is that 
money normally arises because of the desire by kings or 
rulers to make tax collection more efficient (and money 
certainly does have that desirable effect). 
Also, as is shown below, the various monetary systems in 
which the private sector plays a larger role (options two, 
three and four) have big problems. 
 
Higher interest rates creates problems? 
As pointed out above, interest rates would tend to rise 
under SMO. Indeed, the UK’s main official report on 
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banking after the 2008 bank crisis, the so called “Vickers’s 
report” also suggested interest rates wold rise (though the 
report actually used the term “narrow banking” instead of 
full reserve). See Vickers  (2011, section 3.21). 
To more accurate, Vickers did not specifically say that 
interest rates would rise: Vickers said that borrowing 
would become more difficult, but that comes to the same 
thing. 
Anyway, an obvious objection to SMO is that the latter 
interest rate rise would adversely affect specific groups, 
e.g. those with large mortgages. There are several 
answers to that. 
First, assuming the above arguments are correct, SMO 
combined with higher rates is Pareto optimum, to use the 
jargon. That is, the above higher interest rate scenario 
increases GDP, which in turn means that if specific groups 
are adversely affected, that is easily dealt with via special 
measures to help those groups. The net result is, or can 
be that everyone is better off.  Indeed, in the UK there are 
already several measures to help particular groups with 
housing costs, thus there would possibly not even be a 
need to introduce any new special measures: that is, 
possibly all that would be required would be an 
adjustment of existing measures. 
Second, mortgagors in the UK in the 1980s were paying 
almost THREE TIMES the rate of interest they pay 
currently, but the sky did not fall in. Nor were the streets 
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lined with homeless people unable to afford mortgages. 
Indeed, economic growth was better than it has been over 
the last ten years. 
Third, a rise in interest rates reduces the number of 
square meters of house that mortgagors can buy, but that 
in turn cuts demand for housing and thus also cuts house 
prices, so the latter “reduces the number of square 
meters” problem is not as bad as might at first seem. 
It’s difficult to say how powerful that “square meter” point 
is, but certainly over the last 20 years or so in the UK the 
cost of housing in REAL TERMS has DOUBLED, while 
(as mentioned above) the rate of interest has a bit more 
than halved. If that is any guide, then it looks like the 
alleged problems arising from increased interest rates 
would largely be nullified by a fall in house prices. 
Fourth, we hear never ending complaints nowadays about 
the level of household debts, while the “complainers” do 
not seem to have any clear ideas as to what to do about it. 
Well the “complainers” will perhaps be put out of their 
misery by the ideas in this paper! 
 
Barter economy adopts private only money. 
The second of the above mentioned options for a barter 
economy adopting money was a “private fiat money only” 
system. 
20 
 
 
That is ROUGHLY SPEAKING the system we have at the 
moment in the real world. That is, many currencies were 
tied to gold around a century ago, but that tie has now 
been abandoned, thus inflation can erode the value of the 
money unit (£, $, etc). 
 
Keynes’s paradox of thrift. 
The first problem with that system revolves around 
Keynes’s “paradox of thrift”. That is, as soon as any form 
of money is introduced, some people will save significant 
amounts of it. But as Keynes rightly pointed out, when 
saving rises, spending falls, which in turn raises 
unemployment.  
That problem is easily dealt with under SMO: the state 
can just issue money to compensate for peoples’ desire to 
save money. A state can do that for example by running a 
deficit funded by new money. 
In contrast to the ease with which the state can deal with 
Keynes’s paradox of thrift, private banks are totally 
incapable of dealing with that problem. Reason is that 
privately created money “nets to nothing” as the saying 
goes. That is for each $ of privately created money there 
is a $ of debt. Thus privately created money does not 
provide the private sector with what it wants, namely net 
financial assets. Advocates of Modern Monetary Theory 
actually have their own term for the latter, namely “Private 
Sector Net Financial Assets” (PSNFA). 
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Note incidentally that PSNFA is composed of two 
elements, both of which are state liabilities, or at least 
ostensible state liabities: those two are base money and 
national debt. However, those two amount to almost the 
same thing. Martin Wolf (2014, para starting “The 
purchases of equities…”) made that point, as did Warren 
Mosler. And in fact the bulk of what might be called 
“money hoarding” takes the form of national debt rather 
than base money.  
 
No check on inflation. 
The latter “paradox of thrift” problem completely stymies a 
private fiat money system, unless by some miracle the 
private sector wants exactly zero PSNFA. But such a 
system faces another problem which is that there is little 
or no check on inflation, and for the following reasons. 
In a private fiat money system there is no problem as long 
as the only money created is for day to day transactions. 
That is, under that system, most people would want a 
stock of money for such transactions and would obtain 
that from banks, perhaps after depositing collateral. As 
long as their “stock of ready cash” (i.e. their bank balance) 
just bobs up and down above and below the initial 
balance, there is no sort of a loan there by the bank to the 
so called “borrower” over the year as a whole. 
In contrast, where someone wants a sizeable amount of 
money which they intend spending and not repaying for a 
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long time (e.g. a mortgage), that is a different kettle of fish. 
One option for banks there is not to lend unless an 
adequate amount has been put in term accounts by 
depositors. That is, there is no maturity transformation.  
That would result in the going rate of interest being the 
genuine free market rate, and for the same reasons as 
SMO results in a genuine free market rate of interest: one 
person or firm cannot borrow money unless another 
person or firm saves money. 
But suppose banks performed the trick which they do in 
the real world, namely create and lend out money without 
regard for whether there were long term depositors to 
match? Well the rate of interest would fall and inflation 
would rise (assuming the economy was initially at 
capacity). 
It looks like a “private fiat money only” system just doesn’t 
work, and that rather confirms the saying “money is a 
creature of the state”. 
 
The cost of creating money. 
A final weakness in a private fiat money system is that 
significant costs are involved for banks in checking up on 
the creditworthiness of customers wanting a stock of cash. 
In contrast, creating and issuing base money is almost 
costless, as Milton Friedman pointed out (to repeat). 
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A gold standard private system. 
The third option for a barter economy adopting money is a 
privately issued money system on the gold standard. That 
would work better than a private fiat system because gold 
blocks inflation. Indeed the price of bread in Britain in 
1900 was the same as it was a century earlier in 1800.  
However there is little chance of the gold standard being 
re-introduced in the near future, so let’s ignore that. 
 
A state and privately issued money system. 
The fourth possible type of monetary system our barter 
economy could adopt is the one that exists in the real 
world at the time of writing, namely one where both central 
banks and private banks issue money, with private banks 
issuing the vast majority of that money. 
The problem with that system is that private banks can 
perform the trick or “fraud” mentioned at the outset above, 
namely printing and lending out money. As explained 
above, that results in loans being made which cost the 
lender nothing and which thus result in a rate of interest 
which is below the free market rate and a volume of debts 
which are above what would obtain in a free market. 
Conclusion: the clear winner is No 1, SMO. 
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Other objections to SMO / full reserve banking. 
There is no end to the objections that are raised to SMO / 
full reserve banking. They are actually very easily 
demolished: in fact I  demolished forty of them in 
Musgrave (2016). 
______________ 
 
 
Endnote 1. Barter. 
It has become common recently to claim barter 
economies never existed. One answer to that is that 
supposedly money based economies are to a significant 
extent barter economies. For example trade between East 
European countries prior to the collapse of communism 
around 1990, was to a significant extent based on barter. 
For example, trade agreements between Russia and East 
Germany were along the lines that Russia sent a specified 
number of barrels of oil to East Germany and the latter 
sent a specified number of vehicles in return. No cash 
changed hands. 
Also, marriage or the standard boy friend / girl friend 
relationship involves a significant amount of barter. That 
is, the male performs various tasks which the female 
benefits from, and in return the female does likewise. If 
one side ceases to pull its weight, the relationship 
probably breaks down. 
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Of course what drives male / female relationships is love 
in a proportion of cases. But every marriage is different: in 
some cases it is very much a commercial / barter 
relationship with love having nothing to do with it. 
But admittedly this is not a clear cut issue. At the very 
least, the assumption in the main text above that barter 
economies exist can be used to illustrate some basic 
principles in economics, even if it is hard to find actual 
historical examples of barter economies. 
 
Endnote 2: do banks create money or intermediate? 
It has recently become fashionable to claim that banks do 
not intermediate between lenders and borrowers, but 
rather that they create money. The situation is actually 
more complicated than that. Certainly banks create money 
out of thin air. But at the same time a bank cannot create 
and lend out limitless amounts of money without attracting 
money from depositors, shareholders, etc. Reason is that 
if it did, it would run out of reserves and become 
excessively indebted to other banks. So to that extent, 
banks do intermediate. 
In short, instead of saying banks “do not” intermediate, but 
rather create money from thin air, it would be more 
accurate to say that they do both. 
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Endnote 3. Full reserve banking.  
This is a system under which the bank industry is split in 
two. One half just accepts deposits and lodges those 
deposits in a totally safe manner, e.g. at the central bank. 
The other half grants loans and is funded just by equity or 
similar (e.g. bonds that can be bailed in). It is virtually 
impossible for that system to fail. That system has been 
advocated by at least four Nobel laureate economists and 
several other economists and organisations, e.g. Positive 
Money and the New Economics Foundation. Milton 
Friedman advocated that system. Every advocate of full 
reserve advocates small variations on the basic theme. 
For example Friedman argued that the deposit taking half 
should be able to invest in government debt so that 
depositors get some interest. See Friedman (1960, 2
nd
 
half of Ch 3). 
Under that system it is not possible for private banks to 
create money because it is precisely the fact of using 
depositors’ money to back loans that enables private 
banks to create money.   
_____________ 
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